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THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
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REVEREND SULLIVAN: I'll give you a minute of my time to start everything off because you are not interested in what I have to say. I will tell you something about OIC while we are here.

OIC started here in Philadelphia thirteen years ago. It was a self-help program in an old abandoned jail-house to help people to get jobs who had no skills. It came as the aftermath of a series of boycotts that we had organized for three years in the City of Philadelphia with four hundred black preachers to open opportunities to minorities where businesses had been discriminating.

And after the jobs became open, we found it important to train people for the jobs. As I said, integration without preparation is frustration.

So, in addition to opening doors, as we continued to and still continue to, we created a mechanism, a process in the inner cities and now in the rural areas, too, to train people for the many jobs that are becoming available more and more in our American society.

We have trained 300,000 people in jobs in America and put a quarter of a million people to work who were not

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working. And so what you have here today, for those who are out of the City of Philadelphia, is a convocation of some 3,000 persons, representatives from all over America. We have OIC units now in all 50 states. And these persons have come to develop our process and our plans and our goals for next year.

It is our goal and aim in the next four years to train one million unemployed people and to put them in jobs in this country. And we have legislation in the Congress. We are trying to get the President to take more strident positions with respect to these kinds of unemployment legislation, as well as the Congress. Because we think that what the country needs now is more than a debate on full employment, although we need that, but something practical and pragmatic, to reach as many people as we can in the barrios and the ghettos of this country.

That is what OIC is about. We are not a civil rights organization, although most of us are involved in the civil rights process. But we feel the best way to implement civil rights is to get people prepared to take advantage of the jobs that open as a result of the efforts of civil rights.

So, it has been a very exciting process, and that is what the OIC convocation in America is about.

We also have these OIC programs now in Nigeria,

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Ghana, Ethiopia, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Togo, Sierra Leone, and developing in Liberia.

One reason that we asked Mr. Kissinger to come is because we have these programs actually operating or developing in these countries, so we have interests that are rather broad throughout the continent of Africa, as well as the Caribbean and other parts of the world.

Now, ladies and gentlemen of the press, we are pleased that you have come today, and we are pleased to have the Secretary of State with us, Dr. Kissinger, at this 13th year's observation of OIC training work in America and in the world.

Q Thank you, Reverend Sullivan. Mr. Secretary, in connection with your upcoming talks, what specific recommendations will you make on behalf of the United States to make peace in South Africa and also Rhodesia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not think it would be appropriate for me to go into the details of discussions that are about to take place this weekend. But I have laid out our views with respect to both Rhodesia and Namibia.

With respect to Rhodesia, we believe that there should be a rapid transition to majority rule, protection for minority rights, and a negotiation in which the black

African states, the various movements in Rhodesia and the existing authorities of Rhodesia participate to find a solution within that framework.

With respect to Namibia, we believe that there should be a firm date for independence, a negotiation in which all the groups, all the relevant groups, participate, and establish a constitutional framework on the basis of majority rule.

Q Are you suggesting, perhaps, in your speech earlier, with economic help to Africa, a new Marshall Plan for Africa? Is that what you have in mind?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the methods that were appropriate at the time of the Marshall Plan do not lend themselves exactly to the conditions in the 1970's. But we believe that Africa needs regional development because many of the nations are very fragmented. And we believe also that other industrial nations should cooperate with us in order to get the maximum impact.

We have to remember that Africa is actually -- it is a huge continent, but not too thickly populated. So that it is possible in Africa, with its substantial resources, to make considerable progress if coordinated efforts are developed.

Q On South Africa, you said, "Our policy is based on the premise that within a reasonable period of time we will see a clear evolution towards just internal

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arrangements."

Q Can you tell me first what you consider a reasonable period of time, and what you consider a clear evolution toward changes? And, failing these, what action would the United States take in regard to South Africa?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am meeting with the Prime Minister of South Africa this weekend, and I don't think it would be appropriate for me to go into details on these points now.

Q You said earlier in the speech that you believe the white populations of Rhodesia and Namibia should accept the concept of majority rule and you did not mention South Africa. Was that an intentional omission?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have also stated we do not accept the principles and practice of apartheid. We have made a distinction in all our public statements, not on the principle of majority rule but on the principle that South Africa does not, in our view, represent a colonial entity. It represents a legitimate government which carries out practices with which we disagree. And this is a different phenomenon from Rhodesia and Namibia, requiring a different sort of influence.

Q Does the United States support the concept of majority rule in South Africa?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States supports

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the principle of majority rule everywhere.

Q Mr. Secretary, does the United States plan to recognize Angola, and if not, why not? And also, can we expect economic aid to be forthcoming for Mozambique, as promised in the Lusaka speech?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to Angola, the United States has stated repeatedly that our objection to Angola is not the grouping that took power there. We recognized Mozambique immediately, even though its leadership also has a radical orientation.

Our concern with Angola is the influence -- it is the existence there of a large Cuban military force that permeates all aspects of that society.

In a speech in Monrovia, Liberia, last April, I indicated that if we were given some assurances about the removal of those forces, the road to recognition would be open.

A few weeks later, we were given some assurances through the Prime Minister of Sweden to the effect that Cuban forces would be removed over a period of time.

We have been watching this now since we received those assurances, and we have no clear-cut indication that Cuban forces are being removed. Some are leaving and new ones are coming in.

So the obstacle to our relations with Angola

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is the presence of a Cuban expeditionary force.

With respect to Mozambique, the Administration has made its proposal to the Congress, and it is now in the hands of the Congress.

Q You've been holding meetings with the black movement for quite a number of weeks --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With whom? I didn't hear --

MR. FUNSETH: The black movement.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The black movement, yes.

Q Yes. I was wondering how valuable the input has been to you, and has it heightened your sensitivity to the problem in South Africa?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is true that I have been meeting with leaders of the black movement. And I think, as Reverend Sullivan pointed out, this had not previously been the practice of my predecessors, and therefore both sides have had something to learn.

Many of the leaders of the black movement have not in the past dealt at the policy level, and I had no experience at dealing with black leaders, as I demonstrated in my remarks to the Urban League in Boston a few weeks ago.

But it has been extremely valuable to me in giving me a sense of the mood of that part of our population which has perhaps the deepest concern for these

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problems. And these meetings are taking place regularly now and will continue to be part of our policy considerations.

Q Mr. Secretary, your speech today seemed to indicate a concern for perhaps a weakening of support among some black African leaders, and also a concern for the fragmentation of black nationalist leaders in Africa. This being the case, and along with some of the statements made recently by President Kaunda, is the situation worse today or better today, as you embark on your new efforts?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the situation has been improving, but as progress is being made, obviously the difficulties also become more apparent. Because as long as you are talking about an objective in the abstract, hard decisions do not have to be made. As an objective grows nearer, the decisions become more complicated.

So the reports of Under Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Schaufele were, on the whole, positive. But the issue of Rhodesia is extremely complicated, involving, as it does, the many parties of black Africa, of the various liberation movements of Rhodesia and South Africa. The issue of Namibia is separable from the issue of Rhodesia, and, as I pointed, out in my speech, need not be dealt with in the same timeframe.

But it also has its complications.

So, on the whole, I would say progress is being

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made, and as progress is being made, obviously the more difficult issues remain for the last.

Q Mr. Secretary, Dr. Sullivan suggested that the United States should withdraw its diplomatic presence if the elimination of apartheid does not occur in South Africa within a reasonable time. What is your reaction to that, and also to his proposal that the United States Government use its influence to see that American businesses operating in South Africa end racial apartheid within their own organizations? What kind of influence can you exert on those businesses?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We strongly support the proposal that American businesses not practice apartheid, and practice the same policies that they do at home.

With respect to future measures about South Africa, our hope is still to promote a peaceful evolution. And we shall discuss the subject, and I think it would be inappropriate for me to set deadlines or to threaten prior to a meeting in which we will discuss issues which we hope will lead to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and will have a beneficial impact within South Africa.

Q How likely is a peaceful settlement in the entire South Africa -- southern African region?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is an extremely complicated issue. On the other hand, we also feel that time

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is running out on it, and that we have a moral and political obligation to do what we can to bring about a peaceful settlement, all the more so as violence will delay achievement of these goals and may have serious consequences for everybody.

We will do the best we can, but obviously we cannot predict the outcome.

Q Mr. Secretary, today is the deadline, I think, that has been set by the Security Council for some positive action concerning Namibia's independence. Some of us are waiting to hear what is going to be done or said by South Africa. Can you anticipate what is going to be done?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because of some of the diplomatic efforts now underway, there has been a general consensus to delay the debate in the Security Council until later in the month of September, and the discussions will take place at that time, and what will be done will depend on the events that have occurred in the interval.

Q There is a rumor, Mr. Secretary, that you have a crystal ball somewhere. Can you look into that crystal ball and try to give us a hint as to what might happen?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that a solution to the problem of Namibia is possible since the principle of

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independence has now been accepted. But there are still many thorny issues on the road to a settlement, and I would reserve making a final prediction until the consultations which I am starting this Friday -- or this Saturday.

Q Mr. Secretary, in February you promised the black caucus to hire more blacks in the State Department. Has that been fulfilled yet, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me explain the situation of hiring in the State Department.

I think it is fair to say that traditionally the State Department has considered itself -- or has been an organization which has been largely white, and it has been extremely difficult to break that mold.

In 1973 when I became Secretary of State, there were eight Ambassadors, most of them political -- eight black Ambassadors, one principal officer in a Mission, and one Deputy Chief of Mission.

Now we have still eight Ambassadors, but most of them are career. We have one black Assistant Secretary -- the first in the Department's history; two Deputy Assistant Secretaries; four Deputy Chiefs of Mission, and four principle officers.

Now, the numbers aren't very large because the whole Foreign Service is a relatively small organization

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of less than 5,000 members.

Secondly, the number of officers, of black officers, has risen from 250 to something like 361.

Now, it is a slow process because we have to do two things. We have to get more black college students to apply for the Foreign Service. And in order to change the numerical balance in the direction of hiring more blacks, we have started a system of what is called lateral entry where people can enter the middle grades of the Foreign Service without going through the whole process of promotion. This system was only started in 1975, and we take 20 black officers a year under that system. We now have 300 applicants under that program.

We have also created an Office of Equal Opportunity which has the -- has no other responsibility than to improve the recruitment of minority personnel, and which can also act as a grievance board for minority personnel.

We have made a special recruiting effort and have allocated funds by going to 203 universities and 19 black colleges in order to get more black applicants into the Foreign Service. Since the law prohibits us from keeping records on the basis of color, I cannot give you the breakdown of how many additional black officers are in fact applying.

And, finally, we have now underway for a year

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two outside studies, one having to do with the problem of lateral entry and one having to do with the problem of recruitment under the equal opportunity system.

So, while we started very far behind in the State Department, we are making a major effort to bring in more black personnel by the various methods that I have described and by the promotions that I have indicated.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you give us some idea of what the factors are that will determine whether or not you will personally visit South Africa, and whether the extent of their cooperation in the Rhodesian effort will be a factor in determining whether you go?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whether I personally visit southern Africa, you must mean.

Q No, South Africa.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The first question is whether I will -- there is no point in going to South Africa unless I go to black Africa first. So, a great deal will depend on my conclusions after some exchanges which we are now engaged in with black African leaders and my discussions with Prime Minister Vorster.

Then I will have to decide -- I do not believe that it is possible to settle the Rhodesian issue within a few weeks. That will take a more extended period of time.

But if I am convinced that progress is possible

on the Rhodesian issue, that would affect the decision.

The same is true of the Namibian issue which is somewhat less complicated and perhaps lends itself better to a solution.

But the judgment will be made on the basis of whether significant enough progress is achievable, even if no final solution is possible.

Q Mr. Secretary, why is it that the United States has suddenly expressed such great interest in black Africa after sort of ignoring it for decades? You are now planning your second major trip there. There has been fighting in Sudan and previously we ignored it. What has changed to bring about this new U.S. interest? Is it in the American political race at the moment, or is it something else?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that it was obvious that my previous trip was not one of the -- was not a political ten-strike.

We came to the conclusion that the conditions in Africa would lead to -- if the United States did not play a more active role -- would lead inexorably to great power involvement, to a major risk of war, or to the radicalization of the entire continent.

And we concluded that it was in the interest of world peace, in the interest of security, and in the interest of the United States and in the interest of Africa that the United States make a major effort. Because otherwise

we saw only a deteriorating situation.

Having made that decision, we felt that we should make a major effort, because if it is worth doing, it is worth doing with energy and conviction. [Applause]

MR. SULLIVAN: And there is another reason, because some of us in this country aren't going to let them sit and do nothing any more. It will never happen as long as fellows like me are around now. There is a change.

And whatever happens, it will never be like it was before.

That is why we say there has got to be freedom in Namibia. There has got to be majority rule for Rhodesia and apartheid has got to come to an end sometime in South Africa. It is a whole different ball game now. That's another reason why.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you amplify on this point, which you touched on in your speech from a different perspective.

In view of the recent spiral of violence in South Africa itself, does this make it awkward for you to visit, to contemplate visiting South Africa, or do you believe, with some reason, that this makes it more necessary for you to go?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Visiting South Africa is not the purpose of the trip to Africa.

If I should go to South Africa, it would be with the full support of the leaders of black Africa, in order

to bring about objectives which we have jointly worked out with the leaders of black Africa. Whether that is possible will depend on talks first with the South African Prime Minister, and afterwards, if I decide to go to Africa, with the leaders of black Africa.

So, this is not a mission that the United States undertakes as a protocol viist. [Applause] It is a mission which we would take in the closest cooperation and with the full support of black Africa, or it would not be undertaken.

MR. SULLIVAN: Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Kissinger has other appointments. Thank you, very much. [Applause]

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